



# JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI INSTITUTE OF AMERICA

FOR RESEARCH IN MODERN HISTORY  
OF POLAND, INC.

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## Anniversary Bulletin

### AFTER 25 YEARS

After 25 years of existence there is a natural desire to look back and review accomplishments.

The JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI INSTITUTE OF AMERICA set up for itself the same goals that its patron had. The very name of the Institute indicates that it is devoted to research in the modern history of Poland. Piłsudski was not only a chief of state and a superb commander-in-chief, but also, as many renowned politicians and strategists before him, a historian. In writing his historical works he was fulfilling an obligation to history which later fell on the shoulders of his successors. According to Piłsudski, history should give witness to truth, and truth is the effective weapon in the battle for justice.

Piłsudski's instructions were accepted as guidelines in our work, and proof of their efficacy is the 25-year existence of the Institute. In the pages of this bulletin, the reader will find information pertaining to what the Institute has been doing during these 25 years, from its very modest beginnings to its present state of development. The Institute is a research center available to all serious scholars — its archives and library contain many interesting and valuable items.

The Institute does not receive any subsidy to carry out its activities; from the very beginning it has depended entirely on offerings from various Polish-American groups. All workers at the Institute give their efforts and their time without compensation and well qualified and knowledgeable persons are available to help scholars with their research.

Our bulletin contains a list of books and pamphlets published by the Institute — witness to

the fact that its publications are serious historical works. The bulletin also announces a program of activities in connection with the Institute's jubilee celebration on November 16, 1968. In addition to the social aspects of the program, Polish and American scholars will have the opportunity to present lectures and discussions on suitable topics. As part of the celebration, the Institute will also present awards for works pertaining to the history of modern Poland.

The Józef Piłsudski Institute began its work in the U. S. when conditions in Poland became such that it could not continue its work in that country. However, even if conditions in Poland should ever improve, it is the sincere desire of the New York Institute to continue on American soil, serving historians and interested individuals, and ascertaining and promulgating the truth about Poland.

With all this in mind, the Józef Piłsudski Institute, after 25 years, is entering a new phase of its existence.

Scholars are invited to use the library and the archives of the Institute. Appointments may be made by letter or by telephone. Please contact the Director of Studies, Prof. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz at the Institute, or at his home: 85-11 Elmhurst Avenue, Elmhurst, N. Y. 11373. Home phone: TW 9-2755 (AreaCode 212).

### PIŁSUDSKI INSTITUTE OF AMERICA (1943 — 1968)

Twenty five years ago, in July of 1943, the PIŁSUDSKI Institute was called into existence in New York. An aim it aspired to was to carry on the traditions of the Józef PIŁSUDSKI Institute in Warsaw, which had been forced to suspend its activities because of the conditions in Poland since September

1939. In particular — which was taken into consideration in the name given to the Institute — it was decided that it should be devoted to “research in the modern history of Poland.” Among the Institute’s founders were distinguished Polish American leaders, among them Maksymilian WĘGRZYNEK (New York) Franciszek JANUSZEWSKI (Detroit), and Stefan ŁODZIESKI (Cleveland), and new refugees from Poland joined along with them — Ignacy MATUSZEWSKI, former minister of the treasury, Henryk Floyar RAJCHMAN, former minister of industry and trade, and Waclaw JĘDRZEJEWICZ, former minister of religious denominations and public education. Minister JĘDRZEJEWICZ became the first director of the Institute and remained in this position for five years.

One of the main tasks that the Institute set for itself was to back studies on modern Polish history. This was to be realized by maintaining contact with American institutions of higher learning and with professors and students of all nationalities.

Undertaking this task was not easy under conditions in the Institute at that time — its property consisted of an empty desk and an empty book shelf.

Much work and much good will was needed during these twenty five years to make the Institute what it is today. The two large rooms housing the Institute, divided into smaller units, are brimming with books, periodicals and dailies, photographs, maps and, above all, documents. The problem which requires ever-new solutions is not how to acquire historical material, but how to arrange and preserve it. Much ingenuity is needed to place precious portfolios on high shelves or to fit sets of documents in the little space left in the steel cabinets.

The question which comes to mind is how did this material get to the United States, and how did it happen that the PIŁSUDSKI Institute has become one of the most important scientific-research centers in this country in the field of modern Polish history?

The library owes its growth primarily to generous contributors; some bequeath their whole libraries to the Institute, others give sets of periodicals, and still others single copies of out-of print works.

Documents arrive from various sources. Besides the extremely valuable material taken out of Poland which, after traveling a devious route, found its way to the Institute, it also received the archives of Polish-American organizations, donated to the Institute by their liquidating commissions, such as the Committee of National Defense from the years of the First World War, the Coordinating Committee in the East and others. There were added the voluminous and valuable archives of Ambassador Michał SOKOLNICKI from the year 1908, and later, of Minister Michał MOŚCICKI from the years 1919-20, documents concerning the beginnings of the Union of Armed Resistance in Warsaw from the years 1939-42

and many other sets of this kind.

Many years ago, Institute member L. A. KUPFERWASSER from Chicago sent an original manuscript of Roman DMOWSKI giving a lengthy report on the secret National League for the year 1900. From Mrs. DENIKIN, widow of the well-known general, the Institute secured a collection of documents on the Kingdom of Poland for the years 1861-64, including original insurrection documents, letters of A. WIELOPOLSKI, etc. From Józef KARASIEWICZ of Detroit we received an interesting set of so-called Rapperswil documents from the years 1915-18, including political periodicals published in Poland at that time (“Government and Army,” “Bulletin of the Central National Committee,” and many others.) The syndicate of Polish Journalists in Germany sent us a complete set of periodicals published in Germany after 1945 — a priceless collection.

The rich private collections of Ambassadors J. LIPSKI and J. ŁUKASIEWICZ, as well as Ignacy MATUSZEWSKI, Henryk FLOYAR-RAJCHMAN and other diplomats and politicians provide a goldmine of sources for those who wish to study their life and work.

The question from twenty five years ago: “How can the modern history of Poland be studied?” now changes to: “what to choose from this tremendous amount of document and book material, what subject to work on, since everything is tempting.”

Let the answer be works which have appeared in print, and which in large measure were based on material to be found in the PIŁSUDSKI Institute.

Let us begin at the end, i. e., from the book which appeared in 1967. We have in mind the work of Professor J. ROTHSCHILD (Columbia University) in English, “PIŁSUDSKI’s Coup d’Etat.” Besides the many sources and reports that the author gathered in the United States, England and Poland, the documentary side of the May 1926 events he describes is based on material to be found at the Institute, contained in the 25 portfolios of the Commission liquidating the May events of General ŻELIGOWSKI.

Professor Piotr WANDYCZ (Yale University) used the archives of the Institute when he worked on his book “FRANCE AND HER EASTERN ALLIES 1919-1925,” and he made even greater use of the documents of the Institute in working on his most recent book in English on Polish-Soviet relations 1917-1921, which is to be published soon.

Professor M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI (Boston University) worked for several years on another subject, making a great deal of use of the Institute’s documents. His comprehensive work in English on the federal policy of Józef PIŁSUDSKI, entitled “EUROPEAN FEDERALIST JOSEPH PIŁSUDSKI” is to appear shortly.

In his articles published in the London

"Bellona," Professor SUKIENNICKI (Hoover Institution) also discusses Polish-Soviet relations in the first period of their development, often quoting documents which the Institute made available to him from its files.

In the works of Professor W. JĘDRZEJEWICZ (Wellesley and Ripon Colleges) which have appeared in print, the author makes constant use of the material of the Institute. It was indispensable for the exhaustive comments to the three volumes of his "POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 1939-1945," and without this material it would have been impossible for him to prepare his lengthy article on the plan for a preventive war with Germany in 1933, which has appeared both in English and Polish. Professor W. JĘDRZEJEWICZ's book in Polish "POLONIA AMERYKAŃSKA W POLITYCE POLSKIEJ" (Polish-Americans and the Polish Cause in World War II) was based exclusively on the documents of the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, preserved in the archives of the Institute. The same may be said of his book "DIPLOMAT IN BERLIN 1933-1936, PAPERS AND MEMOIRS OF JÓZEF LIPSKI, AMBASSADOR OF POLAND," which is a compilation of his memoirs and reports contained in 31 portfolios from the archives of the Institute. This book, about 700 pages in print, has appeared in English. Another, similar work that Professor JĘDRZEJEWICZ is working on now is to be published in English as well, and it concerns the mission of Ambassador ŁUKASIEWICZ in Paris in the years 1936-1939. It is also based on memoirs of ŁUKASIEWICZ unknown until this time and on other documents to be found in the Institute's collection.

This enumeration of more important works based on material from the archives of the Institute indicates the very character of the documents and the range of subjects. Other shorter works for which the authors sought material at the PIŁSUDSKI Institute and many doctoral and masters theses to whose authors the Institute offered advice and documents must also be mentioned: for instance a doctoral dissertation on the Riga Treaty, whose author worked at the Institute.

As can be seen from the above short report, the PIŁSUDSKI INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, devoted to the study of modern Polish history, is an important research center in this hemisphere.

We are not alone in our work. We have an affiliated organization in London bearing the same name. It has existed for over 20 years and can boast of fine accomplishments. Our joint organ, "NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ" (Independence) is published there. Besides we bring out, often jointly, publications in Polish and in English. In this way in recent years has appeared the book of Ambassador M. SOKOLNICKI

"DZIENNIK ANKARSKI" (Journal of Ankara) and this year the voluminous work of General K. SOSN-KOWSKI "MATERIAŁY HISTORYCZNE" (Historical Materials). Other books are in preparation.

In all, the two Institutes have published, or have been instrumental in publishing, about 25 books dealing with history, not counting the seven volumes of "NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ." Considering the emigre conditions and the fact that they have no outside subsidies, this achievement is quite considerable. We are celebrating our twenty-fifth anniversary less than a year after the hundred-year anniversary of our patron, Józef PIŁSUDSKI. Bearing in mind his appeal to defend and to disseminate at home and abroad the truth about Poland, his Institute, located in the free world, devotes its activities to this task.

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We supplement the above sketch of the history of the PIŁSUDSKI INSTITUTE OF AMERICA with some data on the library and archives of the Institute.

The library of the Institute numbers more than 4,000 book titles and about 3,500 brochures on the great part of Polish history from 1863 to the present time. Many of them constitute a separate valuable collection of "rare books." All the books are listed in an alphabetical catalogue according to the names of the authors. A catalogue according to subject is now being prepared. The brochures are not catalogued, but are arranged in crates according to subject. The Institute has a valuable bibliography of works on modern history of Poland to be found in American libraries. It numbers 20,000 cards.

The press section covers some 2,500 titles of periodicals, mostly Polish, published in Poland or other countries.

The photographic section numbers many thousands of photographs, arranged according to subject. The section also has hundreds of maps of Poland in various scales.

The archives of the Institute contain hundreds of thousands of documents concerning Polish history of the last hundred years. Among the oldest is the so-called Platonow archives, on the Kingdom of Poland from the years 1861-64, mostly in Russian. Many documents are connected with the activities of Józef PIŁSUDSKI during the First World War (The Legions and the Polish Military Organization.) To this epoch and later years belongs the very rich archive of the Committee of National Defense, a political organization of Polish Americans. This material is only partially classified.

The very interesting archives of Michał MOŚCICKI concern the problem of Polish affairs in Paris during the Versailles Conference of 1919.

The most important collection of the Institute is the set of documents concerning the years 1918-22, or the so-called BELWEDER ARCHIVES, covering documents of the military chancellery of Józef PIŁ-

SUDSKI, who was then chief of state and commander-in-chief of the Polish army. It deals with the political situation in Poland at that time and during the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-20. It is composed of about 40,000 documents in 119 portfolios.

The archives of the Ukrainian military mission in Poland (mostly in Ukrainian) are also from this period, as well as the archives of three uprisings in Upper Silesia in the years 1919-21, numbering some 300 portfolios. The so-called archives of Aleksander Prystor contain documents concerning Central Lithuania and elections in this territory in 1922.

Fifty portfolios of Michał SOKOLNICKI, ambassador in Ankara, deal with years before the First World War, together with the archives of the Polish legation in Copenhagen and the embassy in Ankara. There are many documents in the files of Marshal ŚMIGŁY-RYDZ, General Kazimierz SOSNKOWSKI and others.

There is a voluminous set of papers of Juliusz ŁUKASIEWICZ, Ambassador to Paris, which covers his memoirs and documents from the years 1936-39 and 1939-45.

From the period of World War Two, there is much material at the Institute on the Polish government-in-exile in London, the beginnings of the formation of the secret Home Army in Poland and the Warsaw uprising of 1944.

Besides, the Institute also has hundreds of portfolios containing material pertaining to problems connected with the history of Poland in the last hundred years.

**General T. Kasprzycki**

**Former Minister of War in Poland**

#### **FRANCO-POLISH ALLIANCE 1921-1939**

##### **(Military Cooperation)**

The Franco-Polish alliance between the First and Second World Wars was a weighty element in the political concepts of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. In his activities of state, the main effort was directed toward consolidating the independent existence of the reborn country.

Despite the military defeat suffered during World War One by Russia and Germany and the resultant Soviet revolution and social upheavals in Germany, both of these countries, although weakened for the time being, could in the future present a threat to the peace of Europe.

It was clear to Marshal Piłsudski that the aggressive tendencies of Russia and Germany, dangerous for Poland and the Western democracies, could develop in this direction, unless they were stopped in time by preventive measures and an established system of real guarantees to keep a just peace. The victorious Western Powers had the moral and legal basis for this, and they had sufficient material means to carry out this historic task.

For Poland, the problem came down to ensuring

its strategic security in face of the threat of possible aggression by its potentially stronger neighbors — Soviet Russia and Germany.

How did Marshal Piłsudski visualize the solution to this problem? In two ways, which take into consideration the role of armed might and the role of realistic organization of peace. From the first days of the liberation, Poland was faced with the necessity of conducting an unusually hard struggle against an attempt on land and freedom, mainly with Germany and Soviet Russia. Russian aggression was especially formidable. The defensive war was won under the leadership of Marshal Piłsudski, although a million-strong army had to be created out of almost nothing, and the frame-work of the non-existent State had to be organized.

And after the victorious war, in the period of a fragile peace, Poland had to continue to expand defensive potential armed forces, which was a tremendous effort for a country exhausted by years of wars and occupation.

Marshal Piłsudski and the people of his epoch resolutely led Poland in this direction up to the outbreak of the Second World War. Poland made a financial effort which, on a percentage basis, greatly surpassed the defense budgets of the affluent powers responsible for saving the peace. But it was the maximum effort it could muster and it was not enough to ensure its strategic security.

Therefore the second basic element of Piłsudski's plan to make secure the existence of the State was a desire for cooperation between the nations of the peace camp — it was a concept of the system of "collective security" capable and ready to crush attempts at aggression, naturally not by way of paper declarations with no backing in real action. This concept was in the interest of Poland and of a European peace, as well as in the interest of the countries which made up the peace camp.

It was to be based on the recognition of the fact that European peace was indivisible, since neglect of East-Central Europe would also have to lead to a breakdown of Western Europe. The events of the last years have proved this conclusively.

The concept of the plan to consolidate a lasting peace called for the achievement of concrete political goals both in the region of East-Central Europe and in Western Europe.

A new political structure of Eastern Europe was a condition necessary for a lasting peace in this region. The thought of Piłsudski had gone in this direction for a long time. The liquidation of the "Russian prison of countries" led to the liberation of peoples enslaved by the Tsarist imperialism, and the voluntary cooperation between the free nations of this region was to prevent the return of Russian captivity. Piłsudski's federal policy indicated the correct defensive organization of the area of Eastern Europe.

The traditions of the national union of the peoples of the former Polish Commonwealth, which functioned for nearly five centuries, were an example of how the aggressive imperialism of Russia could be stopped. When the federal solutions failed to materialize, there remained the possibility of defensive alliances (Poland-the Ukraine, Poland-Rumania).

Various circumstances — the counteraction of Soviet and German policy, the political shortsightedness of the West, internal Polish troubles — interfered with the full realization of Piłsudski's plan. But Polish victory over the aggression of Soviet Russia did have certain positive results for East-Central Europe. First of all, for a considerable period it secured the existence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and saved Europe from a Bolshevik deluge. As a Soviet leader proclaimed in his appeal: "the march over the corpse of Poland was to spread throughout the world the seeds of revolution." The epoch-making victories of Marshal Piłsudski in 1920 saved the world from catastrophe.

How did his efforts, aimed at gaining the cooperation of the West in consolidating the peace, develop?

The peace treaties concluded after the First World War were to be an attempt at a new organization of peace, based on the freedom of nations. The League of Nations was to become an instrument for the preservation of peace, but it lacked the means of power indispensable to this end. The political climate was far from favorable to concerted action. Therefore, in the belief of Marshal Piłsudski, it was not possible to seek the security of Poland exclusively on that basis. But he did visualize this security in direct alliances with countries which, in their own interest and for the sake of peaceful co-existence, were ready to oppose the attempts of the aggressors.

The achievement of this goal was difficult. This was indicated by the political experience of the war years, especially the period of the Polish-Soviet War. Neither the situation of Poland, which was threatened, nor the concepts of Piłsudski beneficial for Europe, were properly understood in the West.

The unusually inimical position of Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, made impossible Poland's co-operation with that country as an ally. However, British representatives, such as H. J. MacKinder, after they became familiar with the ideas of the Polish Commander-in-Chief, recognized the validity of his eastern policy.

In this situation, Piłsudski's aspiration to base the consolidation of the peace on Polish co-operation with the two victorious Western powers could not be realized in full. Only after twenty years, in the

face of a threat of war was the Polish-British alliance agreement concluded.

In the year 1920 Poland had to confine herself to a more narrow basis — alliance with France. In the first half of that year, the perspectives in this area were quite dim, especially when a powerful offensive by the Soviet army threatened to destroy Poland.

Poland's successful conclusion of the war with Soviet aggression radically changed the political climate. The basic attitude of Great Britain toward East European problems did not change, but a Polish-French alliance became possible.

Invited to Paris, the head of state and victorious leader of Poland, Piłsudski conducted negotiations, together with General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Minister of War, and Foreign Affairs Minister Eustachy Sapieha. An agreement of allied cooperation was signed. This was a great diplomatic success for Poland, if we consider that the peace treaty with the Soviets was not yet concluded, and the general situation in Poland had not yet achieved full stabilization. Certain influential French circles were not anxious for a speedy alliance agreement with Poland, but the favorable attitude of French President Millerand, several ministers and the Chief of Staff, General Buat, prevailed.

Of course, the authority of the victorious Polish leader, and his historical role in arresting the march on Europe by Bolshevik aggression, also played a part.

On February 19, 1921, the alliance between Poland and France was concluded. It established the principle that if both or either of the contracting countries were attacked, the two governments would be in contact in order to defend their territories and their valid interests. This condition, vaguely formulated in the political treaties, was developed in detail by the secret military convention signed on February 21, 1921.

In brief, the main obligations undertaken by the two allies, covered by the convention, were as follows:

In case the situation in Germany became dangerous and posed a threat to one of the countries, especially in case of German mobilization, as well as in the event that the execution of the decisions of the Versailles Treaty called for joint action on their part, both governments took on the obligation to increase their preparation in such a way that they would be in a position to quickly and effectively render aid to each other, and to act in accord. In case of German aggression against one of the countries, both countries were obliged to render aid to each other in accordance with their mutual agreement.

In the event Poland were threatened by the Soviet Union or by war in case of aggression by the latter, France undertook to act on land as well as on sea to protect Poland from Germany and to render aid to Poland in its defense against the Soviet army.

On this basis, military cooperation between France and Poland anticipated the following problems:

- matters connected with war-time cooperation,
- material and financial questions, particularly aimed at increasing the war potential of Poland and the rearmament and modernization of the Polish army, as well as a build-up of the war industry in Poland,
- aid in training the army,
- intelligence and study of the enemy.

The cooperation of the allies provided for by the military convention did not develop consistently and harmoniously. The goal of the alliance was the same for both sides — consolidation of the bases for peace, agreed to in treaties, and readiness to resist possible aggression. In carrying out this plan, however, differences of opinion arose. What were the reasons for this?

A basic reason was the gradually increasing divergence in the views of the two allies concerning the degree and nature of the strategic threat to their nations.

A constant tendency of the policy of Piłsudski and the Polish government in the inter-war period was the absolute necessity to realize, in making military preparations, that Poland was threatened both from the east and from the west. But soon there occurred a change and France clearly switched its interests to the German problem. Not only did it neglect the Soviet danger, but it sought to win the Soviets over to the cause of preserving the peace. This illusion had far-reaching influence on the course of the work carried on by the general staffs of the allies.

The general situation developed inopportunistically for the cause of peace, and the most important fact in this field was the tendency of German revenge, which already was clearly defined, and Soviet attempts to subvert the foundations of the Versailles Pact.

Already in 1922 the Rapallo Treaty, aimed at destroying the peace, was concluded between Germany and Soviet Russia. It gave Germany the chance to build up its war potential beyond the control of the victorious countries: in central Russia there appeared establishments of the German war industry, centers for training military specialists, etc. A treaty reinforcing this cooperation was concluded in Berlin in 1926. At the same time a number of German moves were designed to repudiate the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. This action proceeded rapidly and consistently after Hitler came to power.

The expansion of German armed forces during a few years is best illustrated by the following figures:

their Versailles Treaty state of 7 divisions of infantry and 3 divisions of cavalry in 1919 rose to 110 divisions put in the field during the initial phase of the mobilization in 1939. The offensive strength of this army was concentrated in a strong air force, armored troops, and operative mobility based on motorization.

At the same time, by way of *faits accomplis*, Hitler established useful strategic bases for future wars of conquest. In 1936 he occupied the territory of the Rhineland, depriving France of an element important in its defense system. Let us add that a consequence of the capitulation of the Western powers over the Rhineland was Belgium's withdrawal from the defense system, based on an alliance with France.

Marshal Piłsudski, and in keeping with his concepts, the Polish government, indicated that the only way to stop aggression was to act through armed pressure. Employed in time, this tactic could have prevented the outbreak of the war. At the same time, it was imperative to strengthen allied military preparations in order to repulse aggression.

In 1933 Piłsudski made a secret proposal concerning a "preventive war" to liquidate the threat posed by Hitlerite Germany. Poland's readiness for joint preventive action was a constant Polish tendency in the following years. In 1936 the Polish government suggested action in connection with Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. It would have been the same in 1938 if France and Czechoslovakia had decided to respond to the German attempt against Czechoslovakia with readiness to react militarily.

But the direction of the policy of the Western powers developed differently. The fluctuations of the often-changing French governments and the shortsightedness of Great Britain made impossible harmonious preparations for a defensive war. Consequently, cooperation between the allied staffs of France and Poland in the operations field were rendered much more difficult.

A number of opportunities were lost which, following the Polish concepts, could have prevented the catastrophe of war.

The policies of the governments of the western democracies succumbed to illusions concerning the effectiveness of the League of Nations, the possibility of peaceful co-existence with the German Reich, the peacefulness of Soviet Russia and its readiness to cooperate with them in keeping the peace. They resulted in action which led to the loss of the peace.

First of all we must point to the pacts concluded in Locarno (1925). In relation to Poland, they brought about a serious weakening of the alliance with Poland and the military convention, since they established the necessity of applying the procedures of the League of Nations in case of aggression against Poland. This threatened to make impossible immediate help. Other actions in a similar vein which fol-

lowed were directed against the security of Poland. Piłsudski tried to neutralize them. In particular, he firmly resisted all attempts to revise the military convention with France, and its legal validity was largely maintained until the outbreak of the war in 1939.

The Polish declaration of 1936 on its readiness to carry out its duty as an ally in case of military action in connection with Hitler's attempt against the Rhineland greatly improved the climate of military cooperation between France and Poland. There followed a number of contacts on the highest military level (General Gamelin, General Sosnkowski, Marshal E. Śmigły-Rydz), which brought positive results (increase of Poland's military potential through French loans, decision on deliveries of material, intensive cooperation between the intelligence sectors of the two countries, etc.) But an animation in operational staff endeavors did not follow right away.

Only a clear threat of war at the beginning of 1939 prodded the West to abandon their political illusions to a certain extent and to intensify their war preparations. However, these steps were belated, especially as regards the readiness of armed forces in Great Britain.

The declarations of the governments of Great Britain and France, promising aid to Poland in case of aggression perpetrated against it strengthened its international position. This political situation finally permitted Polish and French general staffs to start serious discussions on the common execution of military operations.

The "interpretative protocol" to the Polish-French alliance agreed to on May 12, 1939 contained the following passage: "The undertaking of the Contracting Parties mutually to render all aid and assistance in their power at once and from the outbreak of hostilities between one of the Contracting Parties and a European Power in consequence of that Power's aggression against the said Contracting Party, equally applies to the case of any action by a European Power which manifestly directly or indirectly threatens the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and is of such a nature that the Party in question considers it vital to resist that aggression with its armed forces." At the same time the Polish representative declared that Danzig was a matter of vital interest to Poland, and the French Foreign Minister acknowledged this declaration.

On the political basis thus set, military talks were undertaken on May 15, 1939 to define the terms of military cooperation between the allies. These negotiations were conducted by General T. Kasprzycki, Minister of War of Poland, and by General Gamelin, the Chief of the General Staff of the French National Defense.

As a result of these talks, a protocol was signed, which provided for the following:

I. In case of German aggression against Poland

or in case of a threat to its vital interests in Danzig which would provoke military action on the part of Poland, the French army would automatically set in motion its various armed forces in the following manner:

1) France would undertake air action immediately, in accordance with a plan previously set.

2) When only a part of the French forces were ready (about the third day of the mobilization), France would gradually expand its offensive action with limited objectives.

3) As soon as the main German push against Poland began, France would gradually expand its offensive action against Germany with its main forces (beginning with the 15th day of the mobilization).

II. In the first phase of the war Poland would utilize all of its defensive strength against the Germans, switching to offensive action as soon as circumstances permitted, and under general conditions set by the two commands.

III. Conversely, if the main German forces were directed against France, especially through Belgium or Switzerland, which would provoke the French army to go into action, the Polish army would attempt to tie up the greatest number of German forces under general conditions set by the two commands.

IV. To strengthen the material potential of the Polish army the High Command recognized that in their common interest it was imperative that France render immediate material and financial help to the Polish government. This help would make it possible to significantly increase the strength of the Polish army and to expand war industry in Poland for the needs of the Polish army, as well as for the needs of its allies in the eastern operational theater.

As is evident from the later statements of General Gamelin, who secretly was quite negatively disposed toward taking on obligations with regard to Poland in the operational field, his tactics contributed to a certain extent to the difficulty in putting the above protocol into execution in a loyal manner.

The military convention of 1921 remained in force in 1939. The basis for putting the assistance into force in accordance with this convention was the *casus foederis* connected with the fact of German aggression. The political protocol of May 1939 and the military protocol introduced a new *casus foederis* besides the earlier one — Poland's armed reaction to a threat to its vital interests in Danzig. The May negotiations covered by the Gamelin-Kasprzycki protocol must be understood as a renewal of the operational action by the two commands as provided for since 1921. Making its validity dependent on the political protocol of 1939 is unjust, since it concerned a *casus foederis* resulting from German aggression. At most, this can be said of the additional formula of *casus foederis* based on the Danzig problem. Thus, the military commitments of the Gamelin-Kasprzy-

**cki** protocol in case of German attack on Poland were valid independently of the political protocol of May 1939.

It was a German attack, and not the Danzing problem, which became the actual *casus foederis* forming the basis of the wartime cooperation between France and Poland. This co-operation developed badly for the strategic interests of both allies. The causes of this were the political tactics of Poland's western allies, as well as the faulty and prejudicial decision of the French Commander-in-Chief, who avoided the chance to disperse the weak German forces which Hitler left against France, when he attacked Poland with almost all of his elite large units, air force and armored troops.

The obligations undertaken in the protocol of May 1939 were not carried out by the French Supreme Command. Neither French-British air action against Germany, nor an attack by the main French forces took place. The principle of immediate help was not realized, since the declaration of war on Germany by the western allies took place only three days after Poland was invaded.

Exposed to a crushing blow by virtually all of Germany's armed forces, Poland was abandoned to her fate.

This took a tragic toll on Poland, and a few months later France also suffered an overwhelming defeat.

The September campaign in 1939 in Poland not only could have failed to bring about a catastrophe to Poland, but most probably could have broken Hitler's advantage. An indispensable condition for such a result was that the coalition war of Poland, France and Great Britain be carried on by the western allies with a will for hard, unyielding struggle. There was a lack of such will in the West. In this period only Poland was characterized by spiritual strength to resist and self-sacrificing determination of its army.

Marshal Piłsudski's aim was achieved; in the approaching war with German aggression Poland was not alone. But his fears were also realized — that Poland's allies might not carry out their obligations conscientiously.



## THE PROGRAM OF THE CONFERENCE

Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of  
Rebirth by Poland its Independence and the  
Twenty Fifth Anniversary of the Existence of the Institute

Saturday, November 16, 1968

The Kościuszko Foundation

15 East 65th Street, New York City

### FIRST SESSION

Chairman Prof. Piotr Wandycz (Yale University)

Prof. Waclaw Jędrzejewicz (Wellesley and Ripon Colleges)

Institute Anniversary — Tribute to Poland's Independence

Prof. Aleksander Korczyński

(Polish University Abroad, London)

— The Road to Poland's Independence —

Prof. M. K. Dziewanowski (Boston University)

— Joseph Piłsudski, the Baltic States, Bellorussia  
and Ukraine, 1918 - 1922 —

Prof. Tadeusz Gromada (Jersey City State College)

— Poland and her Southern Neighbors 1918 - 1925 —

### SECOND SESSION

Chairman Prof. Joseph Rothschild (Columbia University)

Prof. Piotr Wandycz (Yale University)

— The Treaty of Riga and its Significance for Interwar —

— Polish Foreign Policy —

Prof. C. M. Kimmich (Columbia University)

— The Weimar Republic and the German - Polish Frontier —

Prof. Roman Dębicki (Georgetown University)

— The Remilitarization of the Rhineland and its Impact on  
the French - Polish Alliance —

Dr. Jan Fryling (Executive Director of the Institute)

### CONCLUSION

## PUBLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTE

**POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.** 1939-1945. Jędrzejewicz, Waclaw ed. N. Y., Piłsudski Institute, 1946-62, 3 vols.: Vol. I: March 1939 — August 1941. 496 pp., maps, illustr. — \$5.00; Vol. II: Fall 1941 — Spring 1944, 607 pp. maps. — \$10.00; Vol. III: Summer 1944 — Summer 1945, 739 pp. — \$15.00. In English. Contains everything that was said about Poland in both houses of the British Parliament during the war years. Together with explanation of Poland during World War II and is an indispensable source for students of international relations of this period. Set of 3 volumes. \$25.00

**POLONIA AMERYKAŃSKA W POLITYCE POLSKIEJ** by Jędrzejewicz, Waclaw. Historia Komitetu Narodowego Amerykanów Polskiego Pochodzenia. (Polish Americans and the Polish Cause in World War II. History of the National Committee of N. Y. Nat. Comm. of Americans of Polish Descent) 1954. 303 pp. illustr. in Polish. Contains history and political activity of Americans of Polish descent in the U. S. A. during World War II and after (1942-52). Unique source for study of this subject area. \$4.00

**POLICY OF PEACE AND UNITED STRENGTH IN THE EPOCH OF JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI** by Kasprzycki, Tadeusz. N. Y. Piłsudski Centennial Memorial Committee, 1968. 40 pp. In English. Presents foundations of Piłsudski's thought and deeds, geopolitical picture of East-Central Europe, Piłsudski's political tendencies after 1918 and foundations of peace, difficulties and dangers in world policies, indications for the future. \$1.00

**POLITYKA POKOJU I MOCY ZBIOROWEJ W EPOCIE JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKIEGO** by Kasprzycki, Tadeusz (Same as above. in Polish). N. Y. — Montreal, 1967. \$1.00

**KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ.** (Polish Constitution). N. Y., Piłsudski Institute, 1944, 69 pp., in Polish. Text of Constitution of April 23, 1935, preceded by a historical introduction. \$1.50

**WYBÓR PISM.** (Selected Works) of Matuszewski, Ignacy. N. Y. — London, Piłsudski Institute, 1952, 296 pp., in Polish. Contains 47 articles on international relations and Polish problems during 1941-46 by the prominent Polish writer and statesman. Presents the most important problems connected with Poland during World War II. \$2.00

**"NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ"** (Independence).

Periodical published in Polish by Piłsudski Institute in London and New York. Very important source for

the modern history of Poland. Contains new documents and basic articles. 7 volumes have been published since 1948, some of them now out of print. The last volume (7th) contains, among other material, 37 hitherto unknown letters written by J. Piłsudski to Roman Dmowski, J. Paderewski and others. Volume 7, London, 1962, 300 pp. \$4.00

Set of 7 Volumes: \$125.00

**O POWSTANIU 1863 ROKU** by Piłsudski, Józef. (Selected Writings on the 1863 Uprising). London — N. Y., Piłsudski Institute, (Gryf Publ.), 1963, 276 pp., maps, illustr., in Polish. Indispensable book to students of the history of the Polish Uprising of 1863 and Polish-Russian relations of that time. \$2.00

**WYBÓR PISM** of Piłsudski, Józef. (Selected Works). Ed. by W. Jędrzejewicz. N. Y., Piłsudski Institute, 1944, 368 pp., illustr., colored map, in Polish. Contains 83 of the more important speeches, orders, articles and letters, including a description of the Battle of Warsaw in 1920. \$2.50

**DZIENNIK ANKARSKI 1939-1943.** (Ankara Diary 1939-1943) by Sokolnicki, Michał. London — N. Y. Piłsudski Institute (Gryf Publ.) 1965. 540 pp., illustr., in Polish. Prof. Sokolnicki, Polish Ambassador to Turkey, presents in his dairies, supplemented by official reports and telegrams. Polish-Turkish relations and problems of Turkish politics with Russia and the Near East. \$7.00

**ROK CZTERNASTY** by Sokolnicki, Michał. (Year 1914). London — N. Y., Piłsudski Institute (Gryf Publ.), 1961, 387 pp., illustr., in Polish. An eminent historian and diplomat and distinguished associate of Józef Piłsudski, describes the preparation for the struggle for Polish independence before and at the outbreak of World War I. \$6.00

**MATERIAŁY HISTORYCZNE** (Historical Materials) by Sosnkowski, Kazimierz. London — N. Y., Piłsudski Institute (Gryf Publ.), 1966, 688 pp., in Polish. Memoirs of the eminent statesman, several times minister of war and Polish commander-in-chief during World War II; his orders, lectures and speeches, mostly during 1940-45, and the post-war years, but also including his collaboration with Piłsudski, remarks on General Weygand's role in the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, etc. A very important source to the history of Poland, especially for the World War II years and after. \$9.00

**POLISH-AMERICANS AND THE CURZON LINE.** Wandycz, Damian S. President Roosevelt's Statement at Yalta. N. Y., Piłsudski Institute, 1954, 31 pp., in English. Documents concerning Polish-Americans and Poland's eastern borders. \$1.00